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ABSTRACT
[People first, nations second. That's the new global creed that is beginning to jell at the
United Nations . At the 54th Annual UN General Assembly Session in September 1999, both
President Clinton and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan made historic claims that any
country's sovereignty could be violated by other nations under certain conditions occasioned
by ‘deliberate, massive, organised and systematic violations of human rights’. This is in a
world stage where the East Timor Crisis and the accompanying humanitarian intervention
forms a vivid backdrop to the past failures of the UN in creating a nexus between
international aspirations and pragmatic realities in the protection of fundamental human
rights. Could the notion that sovereignty does not entitle a government to slaughter its own
people and that outsiders have a duty to take action finally herald the UN’s crossing of the
rubicon between peace-keeping and peace-making?]
I. INTRODUCTION
Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are concepts which have their origins in the United
Nations (UN) Charter. Among other things, the UN Charter is based on principles of
sovereignty, non-intervention and the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Although
peacekeeping was not explicitly provided for in the Charter, it has evolved over the past half
century into a well developed concept governed by a distinct set of principles.

With the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has taken on a new , aggressive role in the
use of military force as a peace-maker. Iraq's aggression in Kuwait, for instance, was met by
a UN authorised international coalition of armed forces. The humanitarian crisis precipitated
*
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by the Iraqi oppression of the Kurds and the inability to supply food and assistance in a war
ravaged Somalia to the civilian population have presented the UN with new challenges with
regard to political perspectives on matters of an internal nature and the issue of force in its
military perspectives. But it is the recent humanitarian intervention in East Timor by an
international force expressly authorised to use force to bring law and order to the territory and
protect fundamental human rights that has shaken the UN’s classical interpretation of its
foundational principles of sovereignty and non-intervention.

The arena of peacekeeping has evolved from the use of force only in self-defence and a
goodwill presence authorised by host government to active military action by UN authorised
international forces against aggressive governments and recently the humanitarian peacemaking action by an international force in East Timor, to halt human rights violations and
restore law and order in a territory to which a sovereign nation lays claim, characterised by
the use of ‘all necessary’ force and a total lack of goodwill by the host government to the
peacekeeping and peace enforcement action.

Force and the UN: A Historical Perspective
The norm of the ‘non-use of force’, and state sovereignty, 1 is established in the UN Charter.
Article 2(4) contains a prohibition on ‘the use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state’,2 providing ‘ [a]ll members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations.’

1
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The Article is broader than the Kellogg-Briand Pact (which renounced war as an instrument
of national policy) in that it prohibits the use and the threat of use of force rather than just
recourse to war in recognition by the international community after the aftermath of the
World War II that war is not a national right but an international crime. Although Article 2(4)
was first thought to outlaw the use of force of any sort by one state against another,
exceptions to the Article were subsequently used to justify unilateral interventions.
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One

exception expressly built into the Charter was Article 51's recognition that ‘ [n]othing in the
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an
armed attack occurs against a Member. .’ and the enforcement actions authorised by the
Security Council under Chapter VII. Implicit exceptions to Article 2(4) have been derived
from the Article based on the argument that Article 2(4) prohibits only the use of force against
the ‘territorial integrity’ or ‘political independence; of another state, and would not apply to
an intervention which is not intended to withhold or even temporarily occupy the state's
territory or to interfere with the state's political autonomy or sovereignty.4But even this
argument is now under siege after the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the US
President Bill Clinton pointed out recently that rogue states should not expect their borders to
protect them arguing that international concern for human rights takes precedence over claims
of non-interference in internal matters.5

The doctrine of state sovereignty, long protected by the principles of non- intervention and
self-determination in the domestic affairs of states, is both recognised as customary
international law and enshrined in the UN Charter. Article 2(7) acknowledges that ‘[n]othing
3
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contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.’ The article, however, is
limited by an exception which allows the ‘application of enforcement measures under Chapter
VII.’

Article 2(7) is a prohibition against the United Nations, not states, from intervening in the
internal affairs of member- states.6 However, the principle of non-intervention has been
eroded by the numerous intrusive treaty obligations to which states have committed
themselves.
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The large body of human rights law that has developed in conventional and

customary law has also contributed to the development of Article 2(7), which indicates that
violations of internationally recognised standards are not always matters completely within
the internal jurisdiction of a member-state. This erosion of the principle of non-intervention
set forth by Article 2(7) has contributed, in part, to the increase in UN interventions in the
post-Cold War world,8 which in turn has occasionally led to complex operations that include
elements of both peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

This trend mirrors the effects of globalisation especially accelerated with the end of the Cold
War in which states have taken on numerous obligations through international treaties and
conventions , a trend that has reduced the world into a global village where actions(whether
military, political or economic) by one sovereign nation may adversely affect neighbouring
sovereign(ities).9Sovereignty has thus undergone the metamorphosis from individual
supremacy which accompanied the birth of the national state to collective responsibility
5
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which is consonant with globalisation and contemporary cohesiveness of the international
community of nations. The notion that sovereignity does not entitle a government to slaughter
its own people and that outsiders have a duty to take action is captured in the recent words of
the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan that ‘nothing in the [U.N.] Charter precludes a
recognition that there are rights beyond borders.’10

II. PEACE-KEEPING WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE COMMUNITY OF
NATIONS
Generally, peacekeeping can be separated into two categories: observer missions and actual
peacekeeping forces. One of the first peacekeeping operations established by the Security
Council was the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), which was
created with the consent of the parties to supervise the truce and Armistice Agreements
between the newly formed state of Israel and four of her Arab neighbours in 1948-9. The
observers were (and remain) unarmed. This is the traditional model of UN peacekeeping
fashioned by the then UN Secretary -General Dag Hammarksjold who blocked by superpower
hostility to anything bigger fashioned the half-way house of peacekeeping- lightly armed units
of military personnel acting more like policemen than soldiers.

The 1956 Suez conflict provided the UN with its first opportunity to deploy an armed
peacekeeping force,

the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) .UNEF's primary

mandates under General Assembly Resolution 1000 were to secure a cease-fire between
British, French, Israeli and Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula; to direct the withdrawal of
the non-Egyptian forces from Egyptian territory; and to patrol the border areas. In addition,
9
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the Emergency Force was responsible for trying to achieve the aims of the Egypt-Israeli
Armistice Agreement.11 The Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold, indicated that he wanted
to ensure that the Emergency Force ‘was in no way a military force temporarily controlling
the territory in which it was stationed.’ UNEF troops, while more than just observers, were
clearly intended to be deployed for peaceful purposes alone.

A larger and potentially more dangerous deployment of UN peacekeepers occurred when the
UN established the Operation in the Congo (ONUC) from 1960 to 1964. Originally, ONUC
was set up to defuse the separatist civil war taking place in the recently decolonised Congo.
Belgium, the former colonial power, was required to remove her troops from the Congo under
the UN's mandate. Although not deployed for the purpose of initiating any use of force,
ONUC's mandate included assisting the Congolese government with the restoration of law
and order. After the central government disintegrated and attacks on UN personnel took place
in February 1961, the Security Council authorised ONUC to ‘take immediately all appropriate
measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including . . . the use of force, if
necessary, in the last resort.’12

The mandate was expanded in November 1961 and by January 1963,ONUC numbered some
20,000 fully armed troops including tanks, heavy artillery and fighter jets. This operation was
shorn off the UN tradition model set in 1949 by Dag Hammarskjold of non-confrontation and
anti-Rambo form of military discipline. It broke new frontiers when its mandate was
expanded in 1961 to remove foreign mercenaries. The troops were authorised to have free
movement throughout Congo. The UN troops’ military intervention successfully prevented
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the secession of Katanga. However this model of peacekeeping through peace-making was
quashed by subsequent mandates and only resurrected three decades later with the end of the
Cold war during the Gulf War.

Classical Peace-keeping Paradigms
Peacekeeping is a United Nations non-enforcement action which is not expressly provided for
by the UN Charter. Since the signing of the Charter in 1945, there have been twenty-six
distinct UN peacekeeping operations. The early peacekeeping missions, which involved
unarmed observers, were impliedly authorised by the Security Council under Articles 24 and
36. These articles provide for procedures of the Security Council on ‘the settlement of dispute
[s].’ The legal authority for the UNEF and ONUC operations, however, was a subject of great
controversy. When the Soviet Union and France refused to pay their apportioned dues for
those missions, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had an opportunity to issue an
advisory opinion on the legality of withholding the funds, as well as on the overall lawfulness
of peacekeeping operations. In the Certain Expenses Case ,13 the ICJ ruled that Article 14
empowered both the Security Council and the General Assembly to authorise peacekeeping
operations14 and rejected the view that Article 43 agreements were required to establish the
peacekeeping forces and found that the operations were not ‘coercive or enforcement action
[s]’ which would require Security Council authorisation.15

Based on the ICJ's opinion,

evidently the authority for peacekeeping operations is contained in both Chapter VI and
Chapter VII.

13
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The early peacekeeping campaigns had several elements or guiding principles in common; the
UN operations had the political support, or at least acquiescence, of the five permanent
members of the Security Council, second, the consent and cooperation of the local parties to
the dispute was seen as essential to the deployment of the UN peacekeepers. and third, the
neutrality or independence of the UN was a primary factor in an effective peacekeeping
operation. These guiding principles have come to distinguish peacekeeping operations in the
arena of conflict from more aggressive peace making actions.16

The concept of self-defence, as well as the principles of non-intervention and sovereignty,
were blurred and modified in the Congo operation. While peacekeepers today continue to
heed to the principle of self-defence, the political and mandate complexities of operations
such as those in Iraq and former Yugoslavia have blurred the strict ‘neutrality and
impartiality’ of these operations. The UN has chosen

the avenue of active military

involvement in situations characterised by some sort of inadequate presence or absence of UN
forces. Thus in the recent past, the UN has authorised member states to undertake
enforcement action aimed at more specific goals whose achievement necessitates the use of
troops in arenas of conflict.17

II. THE UN CHARTER AND THE RISE OF PEACE-MAKING
The reconfiguration of

the traditional peacekeeping status of the UN from a non-

confrontational role with the consent and goodwill of the host state to an ‘aggressive’
presence lacking in goodwill by the host party whose will has either been bent by the
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international community or a change in mandate necessitated by conditions in an arena of
conflict that puts the lives of UN troops in jeopardy has been through two primary avenues.

1. Enforcement Actions
The first occasion on which the UN Security Council authorised the use of force in a military
enforcement action was in June 1950 after North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel into
South Korea. The Security Council met on June 25 to note that ‘the armed attack on the
Republic of Korea by the forces from North Korea . . . constitutes a breach of the peace’ in
accordance with Article 39 of the Charter.18 Two days later, the Security Council in
Resolution 83 ‘[r]ecommend [ed] that the Members of the United Nations furnish such
assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to
restore international peace and security in the area.’19 Unable to utilize the Military Staff
Committee(MSC-established under article 47 of the Charter )to direct the military action, the
Council established a unified military command with an American commander who reported
to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and the US President.20

Although the Korean enforcement action was the first time that the UN authorised Chapter
VII use of force, curiously, none of the resolutions mentioned either Chapter VII or Article
42. This evidently had to do with the nature and military scope of the expected operation in
which the UN’s action amounted to a sub-contraction of peace enforcement ostensibly to the
USA in the face of underlying political complexities in view of the interplay of reciprocating
power relations involving the superpowers in the two states, which effectively frustrated any
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more definitive or decisive action by the Security Council, arguably dominated by the
political and military might of the two.21

The UN was able to act in this situation, in the middle of the Cold War, due to the chance
absence of the Soviet Union from the Security Council during the time-frame of these
resolutions but the text of the resolution mirrored caution and provided for a formal UN
command to prevent a political backlash from the Soviet Union by providing a General
Assembly(and in effect an international) alibi to the operation. This was a mere realpolitik
facade as the Korean military operation was under the US president

and the US joint

command was essentially in charge of the operation..22 It is important considering that
subsequent UN authorised military actions in the post Cold War era involving aggressive use
of force have had no formal UN command.23

The end of the Cold War provided the Security Council with the means to authorise the use of
force in a large scale enforcement action for the second time. After Iraq invaded Kuwait on
August 2, 1990, the Security Council quickly condemned the action and demanded the
immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraq's forces. In response to Iraq's subsequent
claim that it had annexed Kuwait, the Security Council, on August 25, authorised the
deployment of naval forces to enforce the sanctions of Resolution 661.24

The Security Council took action to authorise the maritime interdiction operations as well as
to authorise, as of November 1990, member states ‘to use all necessary means to uphold and
21
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implement resolution 660 . . . and to restore international peace and security in the area.’25
This Security Council interdiction helped prevent fragmentation of opinion by the world
political caucus against the assertion of the US that such UN authority was not necessary. A
feeling that the Security Council was being replaced by a world sheriff with a posse(the US
president and army) would have politically muddied the issue of the world’s reaction and
would be further proof of the Security Council’s over-politicisation, action or inaction based
on the interests of its powerful stakeholders and the unwelcome emergence of the USA as
‘globocop’ with the end of the Cold War.

The allied coalition forces which liberated Kuwait acted pursuant to the Chapter VII
authorisation of Resolution 678. Unlike the Korean action, there was no formal UN
command, rather the of allied forces operated under the leadership of an American
commander

From the pattern of the actions in Korea and the Persian Gulf, for a time it appeared that the
UN was most likely to take action only where there is large scale aggression by one state
against another state and where the vital interests of at least some of the permanent members
of the Security Council are at stake.26 Departures from this view have recently been seen in
cases where states under the authority of the UN have justified their use of force in Somalia
and recently in East Timor on the basis of humanitarian violations with no visible or invisible
underlying political or economic considerations.

24
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2. Humanitarian Interventions
The principle of ‘non-intervention’ in the domestic or internal affairs of states is grounded in
Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. In the past, humanitarian intervention had been defined as ‘the
use of armed force by a state (or states) to protect citizens of the target state from large-scale
human rights violations.’ Although the UN Charter never explicitly mentions the use of force
for humanitarian purposes, relief operations in northern Iraq and Somalia were authorised by
the UN to protect fundamental human rights and recently this was the basis for intervention
by InterFET in East Timor .

In response to renewed uprisings after defeat in the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein's military
began to stage attacks on the populations in northern and southern Iraq in order to quell
uprisings against his regime. The renewed post Gulf War onslaught led nearly two million
Kurds to leave the region, fleeing into Turkey and Iran. Kurds were denied entrance into
Turkey, and remained in the inhabitable mountains of northern Iraq. There were reports of
hundreds of deaths each day.27

On April 5, 1991, at the behest of Turkey and France, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 688 which ‘ condemn [ed] the repression of the Iraqi civilian population’ and ‘
[d]emand [ed] that Iraq . . .immediately end this repression. . . .’28 The ‘interventionist’
portion of the Resolution is contained in the third paragraph where the Security Council
‘[i]nsists that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organisations to all
those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make available all necessary facilities for

27
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their operations.’29 At the height of the Safe Havens Operation, over 21,000 American, British
and French troops were deployed to the region.30

The acrimonious debate in the Security Council over Resolution 688 indicated that the
Resolution was controversial. Both Yemen and China argued that the intervention based on
humanitarian grounds contravened the principle laid out in Article 2(7) and would lead to a
dangerous precedent31as Resolution 688 dictated that Iraq forgo its right to territorial integrity
and allow the allies to go into the country to set up the relief operation without the consent of
the host state.

In January of 1991, President Said Barre’s dictatorial regime was overthrown by combating
rival factions resulting in lack of an effective government in Somalia. The disjointed civil war
in Somalia that fragmented the country into fiefdoms under various warlords presiding over
clan alliances prevented the transport of food and humanitarian aid to millions of starving
Somalis. In January of 1992, the situation had deteriorated to such a degree that the Security
Council unanimously enacted a weapons embargo on the country.32 As the year progressed,
the Security Council sent a team to observe the administration of humanitarian aid and
deployed fifty UN observers through the creation of the United Nations Operation in Somalia
or UNOSOM33 necessitating the Security Council to invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter
and increase the troop levels of the UNOSOM peacekeepers. In November 1992, following
calls by the Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali the United States offered to lead a
29
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military operation in order to deliver humanitarian aid to the Somalis, the Security Council
unanimously adopted Resolution 794. The resolution ‘authorise [ed] the Secretary-General
and Member States cooperating to . . . use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible
a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.’34

Based on this resolution, the United States sent a large armed force contingent into Somalia.
The Security Council's mandate to use force was unique as the operation was not in response
to an act of aggression. The catalyst for the explicit action under Chapter VII was an Article
39 determination that the humanitarian situation in Somalia and the continuing civil war
constituted a threat to international peace and security.35

The changing status in the mandate of UN authorised action is exemplified by Security
Council Resolution 126436 which authorised an Australian led international force for East
Timor following international outrage and international calls for an end to the blood letting in
the territory by pro-Jakarta militia after the August 30 UN sponsored referendum following
growing evidence of ‘political cleansing’, ‘systematic torture and execution’, and ‘massive,
organised detention and translocation’ of pro-independence Timorese. This force is mandated
to undertake a full military operation with ‘no-holds-barred’. Considering that the Indonesian
army(TNI) is involved a fact initially reflected in the first and second drafts of the Security
Council Resolution but later toned down in the hope of securing unconditional Indonesian
troop withdrawals and less national outrage at the operation, the silent hand of the Indonesian
army is at play through financial, military and logistic support for the pro-Jarkarta militia.37 It
will be interesting to watch this politico-military drama unfold with the UN on stage as the
34
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leading actor38. Recent reports of the movement of the militia to West Timor and the setting
up of training camps and military bases justify more than ever the blank cheque handed to the
international force(InterFET) by the Security Council.

3. Basis of Enforcement Action in International Law
Enforcement actions under Chapter VII, such as those in Korea and Iraq, are clearly
permissible under the Charter when authorised by the Security Council.

The transboundary impact of a humanitarian violation is easier to gauge than the measurement
of a violation's severity and thus a trigger to Security Council action within the framework of
article 39’s clause of ‘threat to peace’. The transboundary effect of the refugee problem which
was created in Iraq by the exodus of the Kurds gave the Security Council

leeway in

determining that a threat to international peace and security existed. With the greater
emphasis that is now placed on human rights and the recent UN authorised multinational
force(InterFET) in East Timor to halt the blood bath orchestrated by pro-Jakarta militia and
ensure the protection of fundamental human rights, it would appear that the Security Council's
expanded interpretation of what constitutes a threat to the peace now includes severe
humanitarian violations.39

37
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As

peace-keeping and peace-making

operations blend together in humanitarian

interventions, proponents of humanitarian intervention point to UN Articles 1, 55 and 56 to
demonstrate the Charter's emphasis on the protection of human rights as well as the
maintenance of international peace and security.40 Several norms in international human
rights law have emerged since the signing of the UN Charter. While certain efforts have been
aimed towards general human rights at a universal level,41 others have been intended to
protect against specific abuses including genocide,42 war crimes and crimes against
humanity,43 slavery,44 and torture.45

While the doctrine of sovereignty continues to play a pivotal role in international relations
today, it has been weakened by the norms and conventions as well as the growing idea that
through collective UN authorisation, governments have the right to ‘intervene’ when a human
rights violation might threaten international peace.46 In addition, there has developed a norm
that member states of the UN have the responsibility to ensure that human rights violations in
other states are addressed.47 The forcible interventions into Somalia and northern Iraq support
this idea as well as the international force in East Timor sent after the international
40
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community bent the will of the Indonesian government which had originally termed such a
force as an unacceptable violation of its territorial integrity and an abuse of its political
independence.

With the practice of the Security Council during interventions in Iraq and Somalia, the former
Yugoslavia and more recently in East Timor, humanitarian interventions have taken on a new
role in collective international use of force with the cultivation of human rights law and the
recent practice of the UN. The Security Council's authorisation to use force, in part to combat
the ‘widespread and flagrant’ violations of international humanitarian law, has resulted in the
gradual embossment of peace enforcement over peacekeeping missions as evidenced by the
subsequent expansion of the mandates of UNOSOM and UNPROFOR. This two UN missions
are a manifestation that peacekeepers, generally trained in the ways of self-defence and nonviolent reaction, when confronted with hostile local parties have to adopt an ‘aggressive’
dimension and ultimately the missions come to resemble enforcement actions.

The situation in the former Yugoslavian republics presented the UN with a challenge which
tested both the organisation's ability to flexibly respond to a rapidly growing conflict and the
efficacy of non-traditional peacekeeping operations. The crisis, which progressively escalated
since 1991, is an example of the inherent dangers that the UN will face in a dynamic arena of
potential as well as real conflict.

The much publicised and criticised bungles of the UNPROFOR are not so much reflections
of the military calibre of the peacekeepers but rather the over politicisation of peacekeeping
issues within the UN and thus an emasculation of the force in its crisis management ability.
47
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The issue of mandate of peacekeeping forces has dogged all discussions in the UN General
Assembly and Security Council in the Cold War era and such forces have had virtually no
military capability. With the end of the Cold War ,it was expected that the UN could quickly
revise its guiding principles on the mandate of peacekeeping forces as well as their status as a
reactive rather than as a proactive measure but this was stymied in 1993 by squabbling
between the Americans, Canadians and Europeans over the issue of command of a possible
permanent peacekeeping force. Further in a world where so many are weak and so few
mighty, the issue of mandate of UN authorised forces will continue to be a thorny matter for
the UN caucus but it is heartening that the UN is refreshing its political perspectives and
military dimensions in its peacekeeping efforts.

It is largely due to expected military action that the UN action in East Timor is divided into
two phases. Initially, an Australian led international force to wrestle control of East Timor
from the pro-Jakarta militia (which clearly envisages the prospect of a military conflict )
followed subsequently by deployment of the traditional peace keeping force(UNAMET).It
must be due to the UNPROFOR’s impotence in Srebenica and the lesson learnt that the
Security Council gave the international force a blank cheque in its military operations. The
mantra is not one of consent and goodwill but rather military expedience in establishing a
robust internationally supported socio-political infrastructure

in East Timor to curb the

human rights atrocities and protect fundamental human rights. It must have galled the UN
along with the international community that a traditional mandate to the international force
could allow a ragtag collection of not so well armed but overzealous militia to humiliate an
international UN authorised force.

governments to humanitarian interventions.
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4. Bosnia: The Heralding Of A New Role for The UN In Peace-Making
On August 25, 1992, the UN General Assembly demanded an end to the fighting in Bosnia,
while condemning the massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law. General
Assembly Resolution 46/242 focused on the human rights violations taking place in Bosnia.
The Assembly condemned the practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and demanded that it be stopped.
In addition, the Assembly demanded that the enormous, forcible displacement of the
population around Bosnia be ended.48 In recognition of these humanitarian problems, the
General Assembly demanded that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) be
‘granted immediate, unimpeded and continued access to all camps, prisons and other places of
detention’ in former Yugoslavia as well as ensuring that the ICRC be allowed free movement
throughout that territory in order to gain access to those facilities. Security Council Resolution
787 of November 16, 1992 attempted to address these concerns. Resolution 787 called for all
parties ‘to cooperate fully with the humanitarian agencies and with the United Nations
Protection Force to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance’ in former Yugoslavia.
The Council demanded an end to all interference in Bosnia from outside parties. In addition,
the Council, acting under Chapters VI and VII, imposed an embargo on commodities to
Serbia and Montenegro.

In response to the Secretary-General’s request for reinforcements of the peacekeeping force,
the Council authorised the expansion of UNPROFOR personnel. In addition, the mandate of
UNPROFOR was extended and the Council subsequently approved the Secretary-General's
request for funds to enhance the peacekeeping force.
48

Pursuant to this, the Security Council in Resolution 780 requested that the Secretary-General establish an
impartial Commission of Experts to make findings with respect to violations of international humanitarian law
and breaches of the Geneva Convention in the former Yugoslavia. In United Nations Security Council
Resolution 798 (December 18,1992),the Council noted the human rights atrocities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In
May 25,1993 by United Nations security Council Resolution 827,an international criminal tribunal was
established ‘for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law…in former Yugoslavia’.
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The Security Council in August 1993 reaffirmed its demand for the unimpeded delivery of
humanitarian aid and continued ‘safety and operational effectiveness of UNPROFOR and
UNHCR personnel’ in Bosnia. In Resolution 859, the Council once again called for an
‘immediate cease-fire and cessation of hostilities.’49 UNPROFOR's mandate to use force was
again expanded in October 1993 in Security Council Resolution 871 when the peacekeeping
force was authorised to use ‘self-defence, to take necessary measures, including the use of
force, to ensure its security and its freedom of movement.’50 The peacekeepers in Bosnia had
a mandate resembling the ONUC peacekeepers in the Congo operation . The authority to use
force was aimed at enabling the troops to carry out their role effectively in an environment
where the hostility of the local parties threatened their safety and hampered their
effectiveness.

The conflict in the former republics of Yugoslavia touched upon almost every aspect of
peacekeeping and peace enforcement under UN auspices. All of the basic legal norms
associated with the UN Charter and the use of force come into play in the Yugoslavian civil
war. In many ways, the mandate of UNPROFOR was shaped by the experience of its
predecessors, especially ONUC. Likewise, the performance of UNPROFOR in former
Yugoslavia

forms a model for successor peacekeeping forces assigned with a mission that

involves the use of force beyond self-defence as is the case for the UN authorised
international force in East Timor empowered to bring law and order in the territory and thus
protect fundamental human rights.

49
50

UNSC Res. 859 (August 24 1993).
UNSC Res. 871 (October 4,1993).
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It is imperative to note that nearly a year of inaction by the Security Council led to the
General Assembly's strong condemnation of the human rights violations taking place in
Bosnia in August 1992.51 Although the Assembly did not authorise or attempt to authorise the
peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, the Council was prompted into action by the Assembly's
resolution and ultimately strengthened UNPROFOR's mandate partly on that basis. Such
strong condemnation of human rights atrocities in East Timor and the persistent calls for the
UN to act on the bloodletting in the territory triggered the deployment of InterFET to
safeguard fundamental human right by restoring law and order.

The lesson learnt from UNPROFOR’s chequered operation in the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia,
Croatia and Macedonia) is that it is foolhardy for the international community to expect a UN
peacekeeping force operating within the ‘strait-jacket’ of traditional mandates to make any
meaningful contribution within the arena of military conflict and/or active hostility by the
local parties. The humiliation of some of the world’s best trained professional soldiers by the
Serbs showed the world that an ‘aggressive’ UN force will deliver more in an arena of
military conflict and that constrains in traditional mandates render UN troops helpless and put
their lives in jeopardy. This lesson is reflected in the broad mandate to the international force
for East Timor(InterFET).52

Due to the permissive interpretation of Article 39 by the Security Council, it is likely that
humanitarian interventions under the auspices of the UN will occur more frequently. While
the norm of non-intervention under Article 2(7) has been diminished by the interventions in
Somalia, Iraq and Bosnia, the East Timor crisis and criticisms of the UN’s response to the
impeding genocide in Rwanda have shown that the status of state sovereignty in situations
51
52

GA Res.46/242.
UNSC Res. 1299.
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involving grave violations of humanitarian law is undergoing an evolution from the classical
,strict conservative view to a liberal, wider construction. This reflects the fact that states are
taking on numerous obligations through international treaties and conventions and opening up
to international scrutiny in issues previously jealously guarded by the cloak of ‘domestic
matters of an internal nature’.

III. THE CHANGING FACES OF UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
1. Big Brother Aggression or Peace-Making?
The authority of the peacekeepers in former Yugoslavia to use force altered as the mission
and the mandate of UNPROFOR changed. The initial deployment of the UNPROFOR forces
impliedly carried with it the authority to use force in self- defence for the safety of the troops.
The safety of UNPROFOR troops later became a specific concern of the Security Council,
which in Resolution 871 explicitly authorised the use of force by the peacekeepers in order to
guarantee their ‘security and freedom of movement.’ The importance of UNPROFOR's
‘freedom of movement’ was closely related to their ability to ensure compliance with
resolutions demanding ‘the unhindered flow of humanitarian assistance’ and strengthen their
self-defence mandate. Reminiscent of the Congo operation, the peacekeeper's mandate to use
force for self-defence in Bosnia was greatly expanded by their authority to secure ‘free
movement’, thereby facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid.53

Another parallel with the Congo peacekeeping operation was the potential for the use of force
to expel outside troops. Resolution 787 expresses the Council's frustration with these forces,
where the Council demands ‘that all forms of interference from outside the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzcegovina, including infiltration into the country of irregular units and
53

For an exposition on the ‘freedom of movement’ mandate and rule of engagement issues, see Jeane
Kirkpatrick, ‘Peacekeeper’s Lives in Danger’, The Washington Post(USA), March 21,1994 at p.19.
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personnel, cease immediately.’ The Council ‘reaffirm [ed] its determination to take measures
against all parties and others concerned which fail to fulfill the requirements of Resolution
752 . . . including the requirement that all forces . . . be withdrawn.’54

The most visible examples of UNPROFOR's enforcement authority are contained in three
Security Council resolutions: Resolutions 770,771, 816, and 836. In January 1994, when
Sarajevo and other ‘safe areas’ in Bosnia were severely threatened, Secretary General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali reaffirmed the "readiness" of the UN to carry out airstrikes to support the
operation in Bosnia.55 The authority in these resolutions to use force ostensibly outside of the
realm of self-defence was not been without controversy or debate.56

The ability of peacekeepers to fulfill their mission and, the continued political support of
participating nations in East Timor and elsewhere, will greatly depend upon the ability of the
UN to create, execute, and modify, the rules of engagement surrounding peacekeepers' use of
force as the situation demands. This will ensure that countries continue to contribute in
peacekeeping operations knowing that their troops will not be sitting ducks to rogue armies or
motley collections of armed militias .Broad mandates will help check the possible casualties
among UN troops. Casualties always serve to dampen the goodwill of states in volunteering
troops for international assignments.

2. Peace-Making: Assertive UN Human Rights Custodianship in the Making?
Enforcement actions under Chapter VII are clearly legal and the use of force authorised by the
Security Council for such purposes is lawful. All of the use of force measures authorised in
54

UNSC Res. 787(November 16,1992).
See ‘Bosnia Air Strikes Would entail More Military Assets on the Ground S-G Tells Council’ International
Documents Review, January 24,1994 at 7.

55
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the conflict in Bosnia noted above are explicit Chapter VII actions. As such, the measures fall
into the exception of the last sentence of Article 2(7) relating to Chapter VII enforcement
actions.
Due to the increasing frequency with which the Security Council has initiated Chapter VII
action on the basis of humanitarian violations, it is worthwhile examining the status of
interventions for humanitarian purposes in light of the UN action in East Timor.

It has been argued that ‘genuine instances of humanitarian intervention have been rare, if they
have occurred at all.’57 Commentators point to the intervenor's non- humanitarian interest or
motives, or other political or economic considerations involved, in addition to the fact that no
intervening state has used the pure rationale of humanitarian intervention to justify its use of
force.58

The intervention in Bosnia and the other former Yugoslav republics was contentious since it
was a ‘mixed conflict’ nevertheless, it can be characterised as a predominately humanitarian
disaster which required Chapter VII action by the UN. The interventions in Somalia and
recently in East Timor strongly challenge the assertion above that humanitarian interventions
usually have underlying political and economic considerations. The locations of the territories
and the absence of any visible or invisible overarching socio-political or economic interests
by the intervening powers point to purely humanitarian considerations aimed at fulfilling the
lofty humanitarian ideals of the international community on the protection of fundamental
human rights as enshrined in the ‘international bill of rights’ and other related international
instruments.
56

See ‘Serbia Asks World Court to Rule NATO Threat of Force Illegal’, Associated Press, AP Worldstream
,March 23,1994.
57
Arend, above n 18 at 135.
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Even in the former Yugoslavia ,the Council, in several resolutions, defined the humanitarian
bases of intervention: the transboundary effects of the refugee situation in Bosnia,59 the
inability to deliver humanitarian aid due to the civil war,60 ‘ethnic cleansing’ and other
violations of humanitarian law.61 The findings that these circumstances were the bases for a
threat to international peace and security are grounded in the recognition that the external
refugee problem and the internal ‘grave and systematic’ humanitarian violations both
warranted Chapter VII action.

The internal human rights situation in East Timor by itself triggered Article 39 in a crisis that
was purely internal. The reports of ‘political cleansing’, ‘massive, organized, detention and
translocation’ and ‘systematic torture and murder’ of pro-independence

East Timorese

certainly made a compelling case for UN action. In any event, although the principle of
humanitarian intervention for the purpose of preventing these violations is not yet recognised
as a formal legal exception to the Article 2(4) prohibition against the use of force, the practice
of the UN in triggering Chapter VII action is clearly legal and presents strong evidence of
emerging customary law.

The increased prospect of UN humanitarian diplomacy of this type will potentially increase
the number of original peace enforcement operations. This is due to foreseeability that
peacekeepers in the future will find their safety threatened as their mission involves
enforcement action requiring more complex and refined rules of engagement in hostile
environments.
58

Id. quoting Verwey, ‘Humanitarian Intervention in The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force’ (A S
Cassesse,ed.,1986).
59
UNSC Res. 757 (May 30,1992).
60
UNSC Res. 770 (August 13,1992).
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The comprehensive UN restructuring of its peacekeeping operations in 1992 would seem to
herald the genesis of a new role for the UN in peacekeeping and peacemaking. Traditionally,
peacekeeping operations were managed by the Office of Special Political Affairs. The
organisation was administered by two Under-Secretaries General (USG), who both reported
to the Secretary General. One USG managed field operations and mediation efforts associated
with peace enforcement, while the other was a political troubleshooter for the Secretary
General. Eventually, the peacemaking functions were transferred to the Secretary General's
Executive Office, resulting in a complete separation of planning from political issues. This
structure reflected the clear distinction between peacekeepers and peace enforcers in the UN
organisation. This arose from the traditional UN view that peace enforcers,who receive
military training, and peacekeepers, who are trained for non-violent responses to provocation,
should be kept separate.62

The 1992 restructuring included the creation of an Office of Peacekeeping Operations as one
of four designated departments which would report directly to the Secretary General. The
revised structure streamlines the peacekeeping administration. A formal relationship between
peacekeepers and peacemakers ought to be put in place. As the missions become blurred and
conventional peacekeeping forces gradually become engaged in more aggressive Chapter VII
actions, training, equipment needs, command structures and rules of engagement on the use of
force will have to be reviewed to reflect the changing nature of peacekeeping.63
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UNSC Res .771 (August 13,1992).
William J Durch ‘Running the Show: Planning and Implementation’ in William J Durch (ed) The Evolution of
UN Peacekeeping (1993) 73-74.
63
See Brian Urquart, ‘The UN and International Security After the Cold War’, in Adam Roberts & Benedict
Kingsbury (eds) United Nations ,Divided World (2nd ed.1993) 81.
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V. CONCLUSION
Following the end of the Cold War, the UN developed new roles concerning its peacekeeping
efforts. Military-style enforcement actions such as the humanitarian interventions in Somalia,
Iraq and recently in East Timor and situations like Bosnia, where a traditional peacekeeping
mission involves an escalating use of force, must be anticipated. The dilemma with which UN
peacekeeping is faced is a by-product of the hostilities of the Cold War and the model of
peacekeeping fashioned by Dag Hammarskjold. Moreover, the failure to create a collective
security regime in the early days of the UN sabotaged its authority in the use of military force.
In the end, the Security Council must raise the threshold for considering whether appropriate
conditions for peacekeeping exist and devise formal rules of engagement for peacekeepers
which are sufficiently tailored to the dynamic arena of conflict to which the forces are sent
and thus reconfigure peace-keeping to peace-making action.

The norms of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence have weakened
with time. The growing body of human rights law and the developing practice of the UN
Security Council's Article 39 determinations in Iraq, Somalia , Bosnia and recently in East
Timor all point to an emerging customary norm of UN humanitarian intervention in member
states where the humanitarian violations are severe and have the slightest transboundary
effect. This norm could be finally crystallising with the UN authorised action in East Timor.
As the Security Council liberalises the finding of ‘threat to the peace’ to include non-military
threats, the likelihood of future humanitarian interventions will also increase. The Council
must be prepared to encounter increasing threats to the safety of its peacekeepers and be
ready to exercise a level of force beyond the traditional legal meaning of self-defence.
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With respect to the peacekeepers in Bosnia and their predecessors in the Congo, difficult
issues arose because such missions were poorly defined, with unclear authority for the use of
force. The recent peace-making mandate to the international force for East Timor(InterFET)
in place of UNAMET with a traditional peacekeeping mandate however shows a clear
indication that the UN is reviewing the military dimensions of its forces by stating in black
and white the authorised use of force. This seems to answer the issues

raised by the

UNPROFOR mission: What is an acceptable level of force consistent with ‘all necessary
measures’ that UN authorised troops can use to deliver aid to those in need? Can UN troops
use force in ‘anticipatory’ self-defence ?

As original peace-making missions such as InterFET mandated to use force are launched , the
rules of engagement and the authority for the use of force must also be modified and
articulately enunciated. The stakes, however, are high. The safety of the peacemakers, the
continued viability of the United Nations collective security structure and the maintenance of
international peace and security in future operations will all depend upon the ability of the UN
to respond to this challenge.64
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The Clinton administration introduced very stringent guidelines for future participation in international
peacekeeping operations. The United States will only participate when there have been grave threats to
international peace and security, major disasters which require relief, or ‘gross violations of human rights’. See
‘U.S. Eyes New Criteria for Peacekeeping Missions’, Chicago Sun Times(USA),January 30,94 at p.36.

